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Imagine, if you will, 1959. Elvis Presley is performing with
Frank Sinatra on The Ed Sullivan Show. Eisenhower is in the White
House. Financial services are neatly divided by charter. Banks offer
personal and business loans; thrifts offer home loans; credit unions are
tied to their single employer and offer unsecured personal loans;
securities are bought and sold by brokers for the wealthy; and
insurance is sold by the friendly neighborhood insurance agent who
lives down the street. Deposits are insured to $10,000; interest on
savings deposits are fixed. The certificate of deposit has yet to be
invented. Credit cards are an idea in the imagination of a few. There
is a bank or savings association on most corners of Main Street, USA.
There are no drive-up windows, ATMs, or Saturday hours.
Quite a contrast to 1999. Over 50% of all U.S. households
own a personal computer.' The Internet reaches over 50 million
households.2 Stocks are bought and sold by individual investors over
the Internet via E-Trade and other online brokerages. Commerce over
the Internet reached $8.6 billion over Christmas 1998.3 Books, music,
flowers, travel, toys, clothes are all available 24 hours a day via the
Internet and a credit card. PC banking attracts both the young and the
I General Counsel, America's Community Bankers. Please note that while much of the
following is consistent with ACB's legislative position and draws on testimony presented
in congressional hearings, it has not been officially reviewed and is solely the opinion of
the author.
1. See KPMG PointCast, Half of All U.S. Homes Now Have a PC - Survey (Feb. 9,
1999) (visited Feb. 9, 1999) < http://pioneer.pointcast.com >.
2. See Brett Chase, Bank One CEO Bets $500M On Internet's Sales Potential, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 22, 1999, at 5.
3. See id.
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old due to its 24-hour availability. Home loans, car loans, unsecured
credit are all available via a telephone call, mail solicitation, or
Internet inquiry. Insurance is an adjunct to the loan application
process. Consumer ease and convenience drive the offering of
financial services.
The difference between revolution and evolution is that you
know when you are in a revolution. Yet given the pace of change, the
case can be made for declaring the current financial services
marketplace both a revolution and an evolution. It is the result of an
evolving consumer revolution of financial services. Credit unions
offer business loans, personal loans, car loans, credit cards, and home
loans. Banking is no longer a checking account. Banks offer financial
planning services including investments and insurance. Need trust
services? Call your local savings and loan or your insurance
company. Delivery channels and consumer convenience, not charter,
drive the offering of financial services.
II. CHARTER IRRELEVANCY AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Yet against this backdrop of charter irrelevancy toils the
legislative process. Financial reform, whether reorganizing the
federal regulation of savings associations, eliminating Glass-Steagall,
trying to eliminate regulatory overlap of banking and its tug of war
between agencies has been studied since at least 1969. 4 Yet after three
decades of study, hearings, market change, and major crises in
financial services, the United States has yet to repeal Glass-Steagall or
reform the regulation of financial services beyond the heady
"preventative" legislation that was FIRREA. 5
Why? It's as if all the parties involved were gathered in a
circle shooting water pistols at each other. No one gets hurt, but
everyone gets wet. Treasury and the Federal Reserve shoot at each
other over affiliate versus subsidiary issues and who regulates the
business of banking. Securities firms shoot at banks because banks
have more flexibility to affiliate with other, but closely related to,
4. See, e.g., IRWIN FRIEND, STUDY OF SAVINGS & LOAN INDUSTRY (1969).
5. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery & Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183-553 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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banking entities and securities firms cannot buy banks.6  Insurance
companies juggle their tentative truce with insurance agents and target
banks because the Supreme Court said that banks can offer insurance
from places of less than 5,000. Banks target savings institutions
because the unitary charter is more flexible in its alliances than the
banking holding company structure. Everyone targets credit unions
unless they think they can sell them a service. And Congress sits in
the middle.7
III. THE FUTURE OF NONBANK DEPOSITORIES
So what is the future of nonbanking depositories? First, the
difference in nomenclature will disappear. A bank is an insurance
agency is a savings institution is a brokerage is a trust department is a
credit union. They are all pieces of the financial services industry.
Consumers will think of all of them as banks. Savings banks and
savings institutions have quietly incorporated the word "bank" in their
names over the last ten years. Even credit unions use the word bank
in their advertising. And why not? The consumer does not care
whether the entity is a bank or a savings institution or a credit union.
Are the deposits insured? What products and services are available
and when? These are the more important questions, not the charter
type.
Second, the industry will divide into diversified financial
services companies and niche players. It does not matter to consumers
whether it is a thrift, a bank, or a credit union that they use to get a
mortgage, credit card or car loan so long as the service and terms
offered are competitive. The services offered by the separate charters
will become, and already are, indistinguishable.
Third, competition will continue to cause consolidation in the
number of financial services firms. In 1985, there were over 5,000
federal savings associations regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board. In 1999, there are approximately 1,300 regulated by the
6. See Letter from Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Committee, to Senator Phil Gramm, Chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs (Feb. 4, 1999) (on file with the University of North Carolina School of
Law Banking Institute).
7. See Daniel Parks, Fuzzy Battle Lines Complicate Effort To Overhaul Financial
Services, CONG. Q. WKLY., Feb. 27, 1999, at 491, 491-93.
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Office of Thrift Supervision.' While the upheaval of the 1980s caused
the demise of many, consolidation has been and continues to be a
reality of the marketplace, although there is a current slowing in the
rate of consolidation that may be attributable to Y2K concerns.
Fourth, electronic delivery of financial services will accelerate
the market's shift into a new competitive paradigm of which we are
only beginning to see the outline. Investments into brick and mortar
may be replaced by investments in cyberspace and smartcard
technology that may advance the business of banking to a new plateau.
There will still be the brick and mortar institutions, but they will play
a niche role in the competitive landscape.
Fifth, the financial services legislation pending before
Congress is completely irrelevant to the final outcome of the evolving
revolution of financial services. The market and consumers have
already moved on.
While Congress can't change the eventual result, it can and
does affect the rate and cost of change.
IV. FINANCIAL REFORM
A. Financial Services
With this in mind, what can Congress do to ensure that
banking has a substantial role in the future of financial services? It
can do the following:
1. Merge the insurance funds. Merging the funds
makes logical, actuarial, and financial sense. The
FDIC supports it, the other federal banking agencies
support it and the market place supports it. Many
individual banks own both SAIF- and BIF-insured
funds. Delay only perpetuates administrative
duplications and stretches out the inevitable. Merger
makes sense.
2. Eliminate the SAIF Special Reserve. Any diversion
8. See Office of Thrift Supervision, Holding Companies in the Thrift Industry 2
(April 1997) (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/48031.html>
[hereinafter Holding Companies].
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of monies from the insurance funds makes no sense.
This provision was pure punitive revenge for FICO
sharing. Public policy dictates elimination of this fund.
3. Clarify and expand national bank powers on
affiliations and product offerings. Banks should have
confidence that they can offer insurance products
without protracted litigation exposure or unnecessary
limitations. Provide banks with the flexibility to
choose whichever corporate structure works best in
their communities for the offering of a diversified array
of financial products and services. No one structure,
subsidiary, or affiliate should be arbitrarily mandated.
4. Adopt a modem structure for the Federal Home
Loan Bank System that provides voluntary membership
for all members and provides permanent capital for the
System. Expand both the membership and the type of
collateral that qualifies as security for advances.
Financial institutions should have access to the liquidity
of the System on an equal and voluntary basis.
5. Leave thrifts and their holding company structures
alone. The goal of financial modernization legislation
should be to improve existing charters and holding
company structures without reducing any competitive
options and consumer choices. Just as there are more
flavors of ice cream than vanilla, strawberry, and
chocolate, there is no reason to require all financial
services to be delivered from one or two charter types.
Indeed, such an effort contradicts consumer choice and
inhibits competition. 9
B. Charter Choice and Operating Trade-Offs
Because the charter, particularly the unitary charter, has
9. Hearings on the Financial Services Act of 1999 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Beard Testimony]
(testimony of E. Lee Beard, Chair of America's Community Bankers and President and
CEO of First Federal Bank of Hazelton, PA) (on file with the University of North
Carolina School of Law Banking Institute).
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become a lightning rod for criticism in the current legislative debate, it
is important to delve behind the rhetoric and sound bites and
understand the benefits of the different charters. Members of the
savings institution industry represent a wide selection of charter types
including federal and state, mutual and stock, converts from credit
unions, and new corporate entrants from the world of insurance and
securities along with commercial firms. This level of diversity allows
the savings industry to speak from experience on the value of choice
and flexibility in charter and charter powers. Participants choose their
corporate form based on business decisions as to what will best serve
their customers and communities - not on Washington-based dictates
that are not related to the local market.
Parts of the financial industry - thrifts and mutual funds, for
example - are already structured to take advantage of the evolving
modernized financial services marketplace. Commercial banks and
bank holding companies (BHCs) have been left behind in some
respects. They face significant limitations on their ability to offer
financial services beyond what has traditionally been called banking.
The Glass-Steagall Act hampers affiliations between the banking and
securities industries. Although the Federal Reserve has loosened
Glass-Steagall substantially, the law remains an anti-competitive
anachronism. Bank holding companies may only acquire securities
firms that fit within arbitrary size limits, while major securities firms
are unable to acquire banks.
Similarly, the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act does not
permit banks to affiliate with insurance underwriting companies.
Beyond that, the BHC Act limits banks to affiliations with firms
"closely related" to banking. Banks that wish to sell insurance
products face a patchwork of state and federal statutes, as well as court
and agency interpretations that sometimes permit and sometimes
prohibit insurance activities.
The current legislative proposals both increase and reduce the
competitive flexibility of banks and BHCs in various ways. The 1999
version of H.R. 10 as introduced goes in just one direction for thrifts
and their holding companies - backwards. It would limit new unitary
thrift holding companies to strictly financial activities and prevent
existing unitaries with commercial activities from changing ownership.
[Vol. 3
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Over 875 unitary charters would be frozen in time and flexibility. 'o
This is most certainly not an issue that concerns just a handful
of big companies trying to "get into banking" through the thrift
charter. Even Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, noted in his February 1999 testimony that the recent applicants
do not represent "as yet any major breach into the commercial area"
because most of the firms seeking the unitary charter are financial
companies." In addition to insurance firms, trust interests and
securities firms, bank holding companies may also operate saving
associations. For example, Citigroup does much of its "banking"
outside of New York through a thrift. Similarly, a commercial bank
in Iowa converted to a thrift and is now opening branches in its parent
holding company's grocery stores.
12
In exercising these choices, there are logical tradeoffs
involved. For the unlimited commercial lending authority provided by
the banking charter, an institution cannot affiliate with commercial
firms. For the affiliation rights provided by the thrift charter, an
institution must strictly limit its commercial lending, among other
limitations of the Qualified Thrift Lender Test. 3 The decision is the
institution's to make. Consumers, businesses, and communities all
benefit from the diversity of services that results from these individual
decisions.
Home buyers are another beneficiary of charter choice.
Thrifts maintain a high percentage of their assets in mortgage loans
and related securities - 73.7% for thrifts owned by non-banking
companies, 70.6% for thrifts as a whole. By contrast, banks have
only 32.6% of their assets in mortgage loans and related securities.'
4
The National Association of Home Builders and the National
Association of Realtors have pointed out that, "thrifts have
10. See Holding Companies, supra note 8.
11. KPMG Banking Insider, Greenspan Q & A - Banking System, Regulation (Feb.
23, 1999) (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.us.kpmg.com/fs/insider> (question and
answer session after the first leg of Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's
semiannual Humphrey-Hawkins testimony before the Senate Banking Committee).
12. The bank was the Principal Bank in Des Moines, Iowa.
13. See 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m) (1994). See also Office of Thrift Supervision,
Historical Framework for Regulation of Activities of Unitary Savings and Loan Holding
Companies 7-8 (visited Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/48035.html>
[hereinafter Historical Framework].
14. See generally Beard Testimony, supra note 9.
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demonstrated a pattern of... serving low- and moderate-income
borrowers. In many markets, thrifts are the leading source of
residential construction and development loans." S
Unfortunately, there are those who would severely limit
unitary thrift holding company affiliation rights for companies that had
not applied for a charter by October 7, 1998.16 Some of those firms
might be satisfied with the improvements in the bank holding company
structure provided by the legislative proposals. Others might not, and
some of the applicants would not qualify for a bank charter. There is
no reason to cut off this successful, market-tested business option as of
October 7, 1998, or any other arbitrary date.
C. The Overworked Concern with the Commingling of Banking
and Commerce
In addition, the current version of H.R. 10 would prohibit
existing thrift holding companies with non-financial affiliates from
being acquired by other firms. The only exception to this proposed
statutory ban would allow acquisitions by the limited number of
grandfathered thrift holding companies. All other firms - financial
firms and non-grandfathered commercial firms - would be barred by
law from acquiring a grandfathered unitary thrift with non-financial
affiliates. 17
These artificial constraints on mergers, acquisitions, and
divestitures would decrease the franchise value of existing holding
companies and reduce economic efficiency without any substantive
public policy justification. Prospective thrift holding companies would
also lose business options because of newly imposed limitations.
These proposed limitations have been justified by the
ballyhooed cry concerning the mixing of banking and commerce. The
facts paint another story. Unitary thrift holding companies do not mix
banking and commerce in any meaningful manner. Thrifts may not
lend to commercial affiliates under any circumstances. And, thrifts'
permissible commercial lending is strictly limited to 20% of assets,
15. Joint Letter from the National Association of Home Builders and the National
Association of Realtors to Congress (June 12, 1997) (on file with author).




half of which must be small business loans.' 8
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation impose the same tough capital and
examination standards on thrifts as those imposed on commercial
banks. Protection of thrifts and banks operating in holding company
structures is equally as vigorous. In some cases, thrift regulation
imposes special requirements; for example, thrifts may not make any
loan to an affiliate engaged in activities prohibited for bank holding
companies.
While undergoing vigorous supervision, combinations of thrifts
and commercial firms have added demonstrably to the stability of the
thrifts involved. These thrifts have compiled an exemplary safety and
soundness record. The OTS reported that only 0.3 % of enforcement
actions against thrifts and thrift holding companies from January 1,
1993, through June 30, 1997, were against holding companies engaged
in non-banking activities.' 9 In short, the industry's experience with
well-segregated commercial affiliates has been the opposite of what the
critics contend.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the differences between the asset powers of banks and
thrifts, Congress should reaffirm these competitive options. 20 Banks
must be free to choose the structure that best allows them to serve
their communities and consumers. If they wish to maintain the
authorities permitted for unitary holding companies, the Qualified
Thrift Lender test requires a commitment to housing and consumer
lending. Commercial lending authority is limited. On the other hand,
if a bank's commercial lending authority is critical to the institution's
business plan, then a bank holding company is the structure of choice.
It is a trade-off between two desirable business options, rather than
forcing a one-size-fits-all government requirement.
Consumer convenience will drive the future of financial
18. See Historical Framework, supra note 13, at 7-8.
19. See Holding Companies, supra note 8, at 5; Letter from Robert R. Davis,
Director of Government Relations at America's Community Bankers, to Senator Phil
Gramm, Chairman of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 1 (Feb. 8,
1999) (on file with author).
20. See generally Beard Testimony, supra note 9.
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services. It is a future that can have banking as its centerpiece if
charter flexibility and choice are encouraged and incorporated into the
statutory framework. The reality of the marketplace is that wherever
change or innovation is constricted, like a balloon, it will "pop out"
somewhere else. The future of financial services is banking's to lose
if it falls prey to protectionism and parochial interests. Constrict
innovation in banking and it will "pop out" in securities, insurance, or
trust.
True financial modernization legislation would strengthen
private sector mechanisms that provide credit and other critical
financial services. It would expand- not reduce- choices for financial
firms by improving the bank charter, while maintaining the thrift
charter and holding company structure as an option for firms that
choose to pursue a housing and consumer focus. Unfortunately, some
of the legislative proposals have been too focused on dividing turf
among competing financial industry segments, rather than permitting
firms to use all the tools available to best serve their customers and
communities. Congress can do better. Consumers and their
communities deserve better. The future demands it.
[Vol. 3
